Ashley. F.Taylor,
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A.I.R.T.E. Begins I RELA
7Xe Stor
THE
REPORT
0 N Easter Monday, almost unnoticed by the British public, Eire changed itself into the Republicof Ireland, a happening the origins of which might be traced back far into history. Some of the same factors playing upon the political development are closely linked with the present state of transport in the Twenty-six Counties
One might delve deeply into the past in this connection and certainly, if the present difficulties of the railway system be examined in detail, one has to take into consideration disabilities arising from arrangements made a century or more ago, when lines in many cases linked up the great estates quite as much as the market towns and were sometimes constructed under a system of baronial (or local authority) guarantees. Those things that happened to the railways and canals in the distant past have a marked bearing on the proposed nationalization of transport genefally which is now agitating the country If we look back to the pre-1914 days, leaving aside the normal ups and downs of commercial enterprise, the railways of that time served Ireland well enough in an easy-going way that fitted the general ,gait of life.
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Numerous small companies were operating with some what haphazard methods, but, generally speaking, the system performed in the s manner expected. Some 30 years ago there were " troubles " in Ireland, during which road and rail bridges were destroyed, and the country emerged with a transport system that could not keep pace with new conditions. When a settled state of affairs returned, the railway managers and shareholders of what was then the Irish Free State found themselves faced with intense competition from a road transport industry, which sprang up and quickly cut into both passenger and goods traffic.
How was the proklem of road competition with rail to be met? The first move, under the 1924 Mt. was to
amalgamate all the railways of the Twenty-six Counties, excluding the G.N.R.(l) and other cross-border services, as from January 1, 1925. This action was taken under the Cosgrave Government by Mr. P McGilligan, then Minister for Industry and Commerce, and now Minister of Finance, in the hope that the resultant operating economies would enable the railways to pay their way and, on their own routes, in any event, to resist road competition.
However, the hampering restrictions of railway regulations remained in force, together with a rates structure based on what the traffic would bear, rather than upon the cost of carriage, so it was scarcely surprising that the game remained one-sided. Bus services continued to multiply along the railway routes, frequently using converted military tenders and the old chars-a-bancs, although as the undertakings prospered these may machines gave place to better vehicles.
Goods services grew and firms like Dooly's, of Birr, r which started in the 18th century with horsed transport, introduced modern vehicles. By their enterprise and publicity system, coupled with natural advantages in door-to-door collection, they skimmed off the traffics required to enable railways to reach a "standard revenue" (based on the revenue of the years before 1914), to achieve which the railway rates had been fixed by law.
In a country the size of Ireland it is a good deal easier than in a larger area to see clearly the effect of a particular policy, and Irish railway executives were ahead of their opposite numbers in Britain in recognizing the significance of the force threatening them. Towards the end of the 'twenties the Free State railways received permission to run road passenger services and, at the same time,. they were able to take advantage of employing road goods carriers for city cartage in the principal towns.
Probably as a result of this association, the important undertaking of John Wallis, a house that had been a town cartage agent from the horse days, was acquired in 1934. Not only the professional carrier, but also the
ancillary user, provided a serious problem, and in the early 'thirties district committees of railway employees were trying to bludgeon traders into sending goods by rail instead of road. They used the threat that otherwise the traders could expect to be boycotted by the large numbers of railway people in the particular localities. All the time the managements appeared to think of themselves purely as railway operators, and not providers of transport services generally, so that the emphasis lay on keeping the road nuisance at bay as far as possible rather than on providing the dual facilities.
One who was in intimate touch with the situation told me that when the G.S.R. acquired an interest in the Irish Omnibus Co., the most successful of the long-distance provincial bus companies, the
greatest reluctance was shown in giving its staff the necessary scope and assistance under a work
ing. arrangement. This attitude continued even
when the I.O.C. was turned into the G.S.R. Omnibus Department Although it was recognized that the railways had to run buses or lose money, the perennial hope was that uy some means the bus passengers could be coaxed or forced back on to the railway.. Shades of the 1840s are . conjured up when the story is told of one member of the railway administration who, on a scheme for installing heaters in the buses coming before him, complained strongly about efforts to make the bus passengers more comfortable, and promptly vetoed the• proposal. Within the undertaking, I am told, there was a constant -duel between road and rail and, despite the consistent profits which they could show, road officials had the greatest difficulty in obtaining money . for vehicles, equipment, publicity or other needs, whilst strong support could be obtained for all "sorts of demands from the rail side.
Inevitable Failure
Steadily the railway itself lost money and was unable to tarry out the necessary maintenance on rolling stock or track. This could not be Called a rational policy, to keep the railways going somehow 1 . . anyhow. It could not succeed and did not succeed.
In 933 the capital'of the G.S.R. was arbitrarily cut by the nei.v_de 'Valera 'Government (Mr. Sean Lemass was then Minister for Industry and Commerce) from approximately 01,000,000 to 0,300,000. With the doming of the 1939 emergency the railway in particular encountered constant .criticism from Government and public fOr lack of efficiency," largely out of its control, and probably due in considerable measure to shortsightedness in the framing of national policy on transport.
One may look back for a moment and observe that legislation in the early 'thirties caused the consolidation of southern Irish transport into three principal units, the Great Southern Railways, the Great Northern Railway and Dublin: United Transport, although a large number of smaller licensees remain on both the goods and passenger sides. The incorporation of numerous small undertakings in the system of Dublin United Tramways caused such complications that at one time the engineers were dealing with no fewer thy 27 different kinds of gearbox!.
War Hit Eireann Transport
Coming once again to war-time, 1943 saw many difficulties on the railway as a result of the drastic cuts in petrol and oil fuel for road vehicles, as well as extensive changes in traffic consequent upon the loss of wheat and solid-fuel supplies from abroad. The railways in Eire were maintained on the lowest grades of coal, the effect on operation being that expresses between Dublin and Cork, a matter of 165i miles, were taking up to 24 hours.
Face to face with all these problems the Government took more drastic action on the administrative side than would have been possible under normal conditions. Mr. A. P. Reynolds was appointed chairman of Great Southern Railways, under the Emergency Powers Order. Although he had not complete control, he was a fulltime officer and, as chief executive of the company, was able to make his position felt.
Surveying the change, the general feeling was that the powers that be must have decided on a long-term policy to abahclon railways, although employing them to meet the immediate needs of the time. There was, however, nd direct indication of such an idea in the course pursued under the new control.
Mr. Reynolds, incidentally, had been responsible for the conversion of Dublin City Transport from a private undertaking hanging grimly to the trams, and reluctantly providing buses to some districts, into a vital con
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cern with a good bus fleet and a policy that provided for the abandonment of trams and the charging of-reasonable fares. With the limited supplies of fuel and spares, no such development could, of course, be expected in connection with the GSA., but the cannibalization of approximately 90 buses kept the remainder of the fleet going.
There were those in the D.U.T. organization who had objected to the change-over from trams to buses, but their opponents had the last laugh, for the electricity shortage caused the tram services to be suspended in 1944. But for the number of buses in operation, a city passenger-transport breakdown would undoubtedly have come earlier, because of the shortage of necessary materials, quite apart from the electricity supply.
In 1944 the Government of Eire introduced the Transport Bill and, as a result of a defeat on the measure, had to face a general election, which, however, worked out favourably for the de Valera Government The consequence of this was that Mr. A. P. Reynolds was to become the virtual dictator of a united transport system, being given power to take decisions and to make them effective, either with or without the agreement of the remainder of the directors.
C.I.F.:. Formed to Save Railways ?
Thus Coras Iornpair Eireann came into being, guaranteed and preference stocks being converted to Government guaranteed 3 per cent. debentures, and Great Southern Railways amalgamated with the Dublin United Tramways system. Outwardly, it appeared that co-ordination was the object, but those who looked beneath the surface had a feeling that the tottering .finances of the railway system were to be underpinned by the valuable assets of the Dublin city transport organization.
On January 1, 1945, the sill came into effect, and at the annual general meeting during the following year, Mr. Reynolds dealt in detail with his plans for building
up the consolidated organization. From statements then made, however, it appeared that the great sum of money which C.I.E. had been authorized to raise in Government guaranteed debentures for capital re-equipment was largely going to the improvement of the railway side. Expenditure on the road department was concerned chiefly with the provision of the still-uncompleted building which is to provide the Dublin city bus terminus and administrative centre.
To make up leeway in track relaying and building of rolling stock, the railway department at the end of the war required enormous quantities of steel, of which there was world shortage, with the result that, as it turned out, restoration and improvement of road facilities became possible much more quickly,
False Impression of Neglect
In his 1946 statement, Mr. Reynolds had explained, among other things, that passenger trains were to be made fast and comfortable for the use chiefly of longdistance travellers, whilst merchandise could be carried from door to door at an inclusive rate, the goods suited to rail going for most of the journey by that Means. But the public began to gain the impression that the railways were being neglected, and this was, no doubt, fostered by opposition politicians.
People began to speak of the "road mind " in the C.I.E., and there was strong criticism at the absence, at the top, of railway management experts or, indeed, of any of those with long experience in transport. Those concerned with C.I.E. might well have ridden the storm if only a useful profit had continued to appear in the balance sheet, as it had when road operation was restricted and earnings per vehicle-mile were high, as a result of this all-round limitation of services by both road and rail.
In 1947, however, came the blizzard, which for weeks impeded long-distance road and rail transport in both Britain and Ireland. At this time, and connected with it indirectly, came the British coal crisis, which cut off solid-fuel supplies to the C.I.E. and caused rail services to be closed down for about 11 weeks.
In the same year came a disastrous strike of bus men, which brought about a complete shut-down of C.I.E. bus services throughout the country for a couple of months. That cessation of road services has an ioteresting 'aspect, for whilst it is often assumed that the removal of buses would mean prosperity for the railways, the records for the period suggest that, on many routes, 90 per cent. of the regular passengers managed without returning to the trains.
The losses caused by the bus strike were reckoned to stand at £500,000, and the total deficit on that year's operation was of the order of £900,000. In post-war Britain, where Government officials are believed to play shove-million in their spare time, anything under seven figures has a trifling look, but in Eire this was recognized as a vast sum and was held tb justify all the criticisms that had been made.
Public Ingratitude What seemed to have been quickly forgotten was that in 1946 there was a profit of ,f800,000, out of which £750,000 had been allocated to reducing freight rates and bus fares. Particularly in the case of the ordinary man-in-the-street, the reduction of fares meant a lowering of the cost of living, hut, in retrospect, it is regarded as the major error of the period. Apparently this move was intended to forestall the rise in living costs, which would inevitably follow the removal later in that year of the Standstill Order on wages.
The Government hope, as expressed through its nominee, the C.I.E. chairman, was apparently that, if
measures could be taken to keep down living costs, then only slight rises in wages might be expected when the Order was rescinded and the trade unions began to formulate demands which they had been prevented from making for years past, or which had been limited by the granting of small general bonuses. The good example of C.I.E. was not followed by other concerns. The unions, in particular, were completely unmoved by this effort, and bus employees complained that their services to the public were being unduly cheapened and that they should have had a cut in that £800,000 profit.
Wages More Than Doubled As soon as the Standstill Order was lifted wages-began to soar. The CIE. wage bill is now between £6,500,000 and 0,000,000 per annum, as compared with the total 1939 cost to G.S.R. and D.U.T. of slightly over £3,000,000. At present more men are employed, this reflecting, among other things, a shortening of the working week and various other improvements in conditions.
Bus fares had been fixed at a low level and could not be raised, although a small increase was permitted in 1947, when 11-d. fares were reintroduced. On the freight side, rates could not be increased because of competition from independent operators.
Encouraged by the references of politicians during the fuel crisis to the prospects of a return to national fuel production for 10 years, fresh operators entered ' the industry in large. numbers. Many small men saw great scope in the Government's scheme for the local production of hard-won turf. They therefore invested savings, including Army gratuities, British and Irish, in lorries to be bought on the hire-purchase system. Later, further reference must be made' to their problems.
Of the general transport situation, it must be observed that wage Costs continued tolnerease, and the rise in the price of materials was even heavier in Eire than in Britain, as for many purposes the Twenty-six Counties are regarded as an export market, and probably bear certain extra profit charges in the interests of the British export effort,