AHEAD OF ITS TIME
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When launched in 1975, Ford's Transcontinental seemed to have everything going for it. Eight years later it was dropped. The reasons for its failure make an interesting tale.
• "Built stronger to last longer", Ford's Transcontinental haulage chassis was launched in the middle of 1975. At the time Commercial Motor wrote: "Drivers will love the Ford Transcontinental," but within eight years we were reporting "Ford drops two" as Ford discontinued both the Transcontinental and the A-series light truck.
The distinctive Renault (nee Berliet) Transcontinental cab can still be seen nodding its way up the Ml, and the truck is still highly rated by owner-operators and fleets like NFC's Alpine distribution that handles Birds Eye's frozen foods and latterly Rudclles Bitter Beer. On the sales side, however, the Transcontinental nodded its way into a massive slump in truck sales around 1980, or at least that is Ford's story on the demise of the truck that is frequently described as having been "built before its time".
In fact the reasons behind the failure of the truck have more to do with Ford than the tumbling market; and in spite of the merging of several firms in the aftermath of the sales slump, Transcontinental's main rivals are still going strong. Transconti's demise was rather a sad reflection of Ford's inability to manufacture and sell a relatively low-volume product in a highly competitive market.
NEW GROUND
Designed by a select engineering fraternity led by Walter Manning (previously with Guy), the Transcontinental broke new ground for Ford by using bought-in components.
The cab was from Berleit, with Ford's glass-reinforced-plastic panels below the waistline. The frame came from the Louisville L-series Ford truck range, with some modifications, and had high-tensile steel sidemembers.
As the American frames were already engineered to accept Cummins engines, Ford of Europe took them as well. The first Cummins engines were based on the 14-litre Cummins lump. The base model, however, took a naturally-aspirated unit from America stroked to 15.2 litres and named the Super 252. This unit gave 180kW (242hp) installed, and was fitted at the insistence of Ford of Germany to compete with the naturally-aspirated Mercedes engines. The other four engines were all blown derivatives of the Cummins NTC 355E engine, were rated at 201,227 and 265kW (269hp, 304hp, and 335hp) when installed.
Ford soldiered on with the Super 252 for just over a year, whereupon the company dropped the naturally-aspirated engine in favour of a de-rated version of the NTC 290 turbocharged engine, developing around 179kW (240hp nett). It wasn't until 1978, and the culmination of service problems associated with the insulated-earthreturn wiring, that Ford announced a new range of engines for the Transcontinental, and the adoption of negative-earth wiring.
The new engines were all derivatives of the Cummins E-series units and were nicknamed "Big Cam" engines because of the camshaft diameter increase from 50.8mm to 63.5mm. The base models received the downrated NTE 290 (255) engine giving around 182kW (244hp) nett. The NTE 290 engine gave 204kW (274hp); the NTE 350 gave 239kW (320hp); and the largest NTE 370 engine gave 242kW (352hp). They all featured Ho!set turbochargers, with the first three units giving peak power at 1,900rpm, and the NTE 370 unit extending its revs to 2,10Orpm.
Even with the adoption of the Big Cam engines, Ford could not take the Cummins product unmodified. In this case the engines were specified with cutback modified pistons which, Ford maintained, gave better power delivery. When Cununins exposed all this as a complete farago, the engineering homologation had all been done, and the ineffective pistons remained with the Transconti throughout the rest of its life.
OPTIONAL SPLITTER
The gearboxes used were the Fuller ninespeed range-change units, with an optional splitter on the top four gears. The clutch was a twin-plate Dana Spicer unit, and the axles were single-reduction units from Rockwell.
There is no doubt that with its Cummins/Fuller/Rockwell driveline the Transcontinental had formidable reserves of durability. The big truck also used some of the latest advances in its equipment. At various times the Transcontinental was fitted with oil filled hubs; guillotine-type exhaust brake; two-ram power steering; suspended cab; circuit breakers instead of fuses; high-tensile chassis sidemembers; and an elaborate vehicle checking system that could be used from within the comfort of the cab.
So there it was, a mega truck designed for 40-tonnes operation, with all the latest developments in equipment, a distanceeating driveline, and — certainly with the second series of engines — an economical, powerful power unit. The problems encountered with the vehicle were mainly concerned with the manner in which it was inspired, and the then 32-tonne gross weight limit in the UK.
ENGINEERING
On the engineering side, most of the complaints about the Ford concerned the cab and its suspension. The Berliet cab was very heavy and the Ford HA 4227's kerbweight, at 6,913kg, was over a tonne heavier than the Scania LB Ill's or the MAN 16.232's.
It is rumoured that Ford was unhappy about offering a Jacobs Brake to the specification as it added around 100mm to the height of the engine, and hence the cab. As it was, the cab stood over 300trun higher than any of the opposition, and this had a commensurate effect on the Transconti's fuel consumption.
The other bone of contention with the cab was the suspension system which many drivers found to be too soft, and which allowed the cab to oscillate rather disconcertingly. Ford always denied that the seat, cab, and vehicle suspension could get out-of-phase and cause this effect; but after the company had altered the spring and damper rates on the vehicle suspension, there were far fewer complaints.
Another possible cause of the nodding effect seen on many Transcontinentals, may have been the ease with which the front axle could be overloaded, even at 32-tonnes gross weight. NFC continually found this, and had to be very careful when loading or unloading the semitrailers.
The frame caused some complaints, as the high-tensile steel sidemembers were hard to drill, and welding them reduced the metal's strength. Ford sold eight drilled holes in the frame for 232 as a Special Vehicles Option when Transcontinental first appeared.
The main engineering problem with the Transcontinental was over-exuberance in the vehicle specification. The truck was designed to pull 40 tonnes at a time when the UK limit was 32 tonnes. The truck's power and torque reflected the massive weight it was designed to pull, and made it pleasant to drive. The fuel economy, and the payload also reflected the design criteria, and consequently made the vehicle expensive to run. On our test of the Transcontinental (CM 24 October 1975) the HA4231 could only achieve 47.9 litres/ 100km (5.9 mpg), against 39.7 litres/ 100km (7.1 mpg) from the Mercedes 1626, and 44.8 fitres/100lun (6.3 mpg) from the Dodge K3820P. Admittedly, the first Transcontinental was tested with a box body, which was unusual for the time. A later test of the Ford HA3427 in the same year yielded a consumption of 43.5 litres/100km (6.5 mpg) from the lowerpowered truck, with a flat-bed trailer.
MANUFACTURING
Ford's main blind spot in producing the Transcontinental was a failure to realise that it could not simply "pile 'em high, and sell 'em cheap" (not that the Transcontinental was cheap) as it could with the D-series. The vehicle was assembled at first in Amsterdam, at Ford's "top-up" plant that produced extra Transits and Cortinas in periods of high demand. Production of the Transcontinental carried most of the fixed costs for this plant, and this cut into the truck's profitability.
It is doubtful whether the Transcontinental made much of a profit until production was switched to the Foden/ Paccar-owned Sandbach Engineering plant in 1981. With vehicle painting by Karrier in Dunstable, Transcontinental started to show a clear profit for the remainder of its 18-month life.
The other problem with the manufacturing is linked with Ford's desire to produce a standard model that it could sell in large numbers. Internal Ford memos of the time discuss the problem of the vast range of SVO options that increased the truck's delivery time and ate into the profit margins. Every vehicle had to come through SVO near Amsterdam if it was even to be delivered with air equipment, and a fifth-wheel coupling. In practise this was a long-winded, and expensive process, and Ford eventually farmed-out a lot of the SVO work to outside contractors like Terberg.
Many customers took the Transcontinental in the basic form, and had the extra work done themselves to circumvent the SVO morass. Haulier David White (CM 17 January 1981) said he found SVO to be "slow and expensive". He took his trucks to his local bodybuilder to finish them off.
MARKETING
At the time of Transcontinental's launch in 1975, the Ford dealer network consisted mainly of car dealers, some of which were equipped to service the A-series and the D-series light trucks. On the Continent this was even more of a problem, and many dealers were only equipped to service passengers cars. Upgrading the dealer network to cope with Transcontinental was very expensive, and more successful in the UK than in Europe.
Competitors reacted strongly to the Transconti's launch, with owners offered large discounts to take a one-make fleet from one of the competitors. Salesmen at the time talk of large orders taken at a motor show, which had dwindled to nothing after a visit from one of the competition a week later. In fact, Transcontinental did reasonably well in parts of Europe, including France and Italy. Those initial orders, however, were rarely repeated.
The other aspect of the Transcontinental's marketing was the price. In 1975 the Ford HA 4227 cost 213,450 including a fifth wheel. The equivalent Scania LB112 cost 213,206, the Volvo F88-32 cost 213,025, the Scammell Crusader cost 213,016, the Leyland Marathon, 212,842 and the Guy Big J4T cost 210,406. The high price of the Ford included the standard sleeper cab, but it was still a pricey vehicle for only 32-tonnes operation.
Even at the end of its life, the Transcontinental was an expensive truck, although taking inflation into account it was no more expensive in 1980 than in 1975. In pricing the Transcontinental, Ford seems to have become a victim of the profit margins of its suppliers.
THE END AND NOW
By 1982, the world had felt the effects of the massive oil price increases of 1973 and 1974. The transport industry went into recession, and Ford faced world-wide losses in 1980-82. The UK operation remitted larger amounts to the body corporate, and eventually itself faced an operating loss of 214 million in 1984.
Before this, however, Ford UK had rushed around chopping off arms to save the patient. One of those unhealthy arms was the Transcontinental project, and the man with the axe was Alex Trotman, then vice-president of truck operations for Ford of Europe.
The select clan of engineers and marketing men was split up and thrown to the automotive four winds. Many of them still work for Ford, or Iveco Ford, although Bob Lutz, the man in charge originally, now runs Chrysler in America. He would not speak to us, not wanting to be a "hindsight quarter back" (whatever that means).
Many people have, however, and most of them are proud to have worked on the Transcontinental project.
All of them claim that the Transcontinental was built to last, and the driveline should have lasted for at least one million kilometers. All of them also insist that the Transcontinental was a truck that was "built before its time". Our interviews with hauliers bear out the former claim, and a look at the specification sheet bears out the latter.
Transcontinental does last. It was a good truck, but it failed to last the course in sales terms, and that meant that it had a limited life in large fleets, where transport managers look for continuity of supply, as well as a truck that will endure.
The lessons from the Transcontinental story have largely been learnt by other manufacturers. Marketing, service backup, and competitive pricing are the positive aspects of the lesson. The sad part is that truck manufacturers are unlikely to offer a vehicle so ahead of its time ever again. Persuading buyers that they need to spend extra money for such a project is just too much of a risk.
0 by Andrew English